The importance of IGEPN´s local observatory, OVT
The strong onset of Tungurahua´s unrest in September 1999 required that a local observatory be established. The generous loan of a hacienda farmhouse 13 km NW of the volcano, provided an ideal line-of-sight view of the volcano (Figure 3). The Observatorio del Volcán Tungurahua, OVT, is staffed by a senior scientist and an assistant on rotating shifts of eight days, thus satisfying the need to have a sustained local scientific presence which greatly facilitates rapid recognition of changes on the volcano and in managing developing situations, if necessary. These two individuals record visual and audible activity, foster and evaluate incoming signals from the volcano´s monitoring network, provide support to national and international scientists and students conducting fieldwork on the volcano, participate in meetings at the local and provincial level, communicate with the populace at large, give interviews for radio and TV stations and to the press, and provide frequent verbal updates about the volcanic activity over the regional UHF radio system. They also perform data collection from thermal springs, gas measurements with mini-DOAS, and make observations and sampling of fresh ash and lahar deposits. Observations made by the local volcano observers, vigías, reporting to OVT over the radio system, are recorded at all hours. During the months-long intervals of relative quiescence between strong eruptive periods, activities at OVT are in a lull and the demands are lower. Generally OVT scientists can catch up on field work, academic obligations, and perform upkeep of the monitoring network around the volcano.
During the eruptive period from 1999 to early 2006, the permanent presence of IGEPN scientists at the volcano assured people that the volcano was being monitored full time. Nonetheless this volcano monitoring service wasn´t exempt from risk. In 2000 several of Baños’ hotel owners blamed the OVT and IGEPN scientists for lack of tourist visitation to their facilities, proclaiming that excessive information about the volcano´s behavior was being shown in the media and tourists were canceling their hotel reservations in Baños. Their hostile attitudes were perhaps a lingering response to the evacuation in 16 October 1999 to January 5, 2000, when all Baños´ hotels closed, thus causing a local economic crisis (Lane et al. 2003). At the most critical moment some hotel owners threatened to chase out OVT scientists with machetes and even to set the observatory on fire! Eventually the difficulties were worked out and faded with time, mostly because the OVT personal began giving weekly live interviews on a Baños radio station in which the townspeople heard updates of the volcano´s status and a daily interpretation of monitoring data. Many talks were also given to communities about the nature and benefits of volcano monitoring and trends in the eruptive process; some talks were done under the auspicious of a European Community-funded DIPECHO project, which at that time was involved in ameliorating social issues in the affected areas to the west of the cone. Local people also became accustomed to the permanent presence of the IGEPN scientists in the area, eventually perceiving OVT operations and its mission as a benefit to their overall security. Meanwhile, the economic base improved around Baños and tourists again filled the hotels, even though the volcano remained active and the IGEPN continued normal reporting (Sword-Daniels et al. 2011).
Compared with the basic setup of fifteen years ago, the monitoring network in 2015 is considerably more robust. OVT relies on broad band (BB) and short period seismic networks and also infrasound sensors linked to the BB stations (Kumagai et al. 2010). Telemetered electronic tiltmeters, continuous GPS stations, continuously recording video and thermal cameras, more lahar monitors and four telemetered SO2 detection systems (DOAS) have greatly improved the IGEPN´s capacity to provide better prognosis before eruptive activity´s onset (Figure 3). Also, during eruptions a 25 station ash-collection network is used to evaluate rates of ash accumulation and volumes (Bernard et al. 2013).
The social/political network around the volcano
Since the onset of Tungurahua´s eruptive activity the IGEPN has maintained broad working relationships with mayors, governors and other popularly-elected officials, as well as central government-designated public servants and civil defense personnel. Elected public servants generally serve for 4 years. Between 1999 and 2006 risk management before and during natural hazard events was carried out by the Ecuadorian Civil Defense through personal in their local, provincial and national offices. Subsequently, after 2006 the newly formed National Secretary of Risk Management (SNGR) became the main coordinating entity charged with risk mitigation in the face of floods, landslides, volcanic and seismic activity. Since early 2014, each county throughout the country is required to designate a risk management coordinator whose job is to prepare local citizens before events of adverse nature and also to coordinate mitigating actions at the county level. The SNGR of the national government interacts with the governors of each province, overseeing the coordination of activities between county and provincial officials. Overall this setup has enabled the IGEPN to provide rapid and frequent briefings to authorities concerning increases in pre-eruption signals and to help them to make critical decisions before major eruptive events. Baños did not have evacuation plans prior to the reactivation of the volcano in 1999, nor when the city and high-risk areas around the volcano were forcefully evacuated for three months starting on 16 October, 1999, at which time the Ecuadorian military handled all procedures. The forced and prolonged evacuation of 26,000 residents generated deep resentment in the affected citizens and huge economic loses. They fully blamed the IGEPN for the actions taken, even though we had not made the decisions to evacuate them or keep them away from their homes and livelihoods for 3 months (Tobin and Whiteford 2002). It took years to overcome these accusations and part of the IGEPN´s response was to develop positive interactions with the local community (Leonard et al. 2005).
But evacuation plans existed and were used to evacuate Baños during the paroxysmal stage of the 17 August 2006 sub-Plinian eruption. In this instance, given the volcano´s strong, overwhelming superficial manifestations, the townspeople willingly evacuated to safe zones. Subsequently, no other broad evacuations have occurred, however smaller village-specific evacuations have occurred before heightened eruptive activity in May 2010 and February, 2014. Also, in most cases when activity ramps up, members of the communities of Cusúa and Bilbao sleep in safe zones, and return in the morning to do chores.
Some officials are willing to act on pre-eruptive advisories from IGEPN scientists, while others are more reluctant to act due to the pressure from local hotel and tourist interests, again, particularly in Baños. Two cases illustrate these circumstances. Days before the 14 July 2006 eruption, the governor of Tungurahua province demanded in a written statement that the IGEPN desist from reporting about the volcano´s condition, claiming that it was chasing tourism away from Baños. He proclaimed that from then on he personally would be fielding all responses to inquiries from members of the press, local and national officials, and the population at large about the volcano´s activity (Figure 4). At this time daily and special reports were being prepared at the IGEPN and sent out to 560 recipients via fax and internet, and up to 10 interviews with the media were granted daily from OVT and the Quito office. The IGEPN respectfully obeyed the written order and smartly redirected telephone calls and requests for scientific information and interviews to the governor’s office and personal phones, so that he could explain to all concerned the rapidly evolving state of the volcano on a 24/7 basis. His readiness to take on this task quickly waned when he recognized his shortcomings to credibly answer questions about the volcano’s heighten state of restlessness and in perceiving the constant and extraordinary social pressure to provide immediate and reliable scientific information. Within 24 hours, via a second written order, the governor reinstated the IGEPN’s communication responsibilities, barely two days before the 14 July 2006 (VEI = 2) eruption.
A month later, on the morning of the 16th of August 2006, about 14 hours before onset of Tungurahua´s largest eruption since 1918, amidst unceasing high-decibel explosions and continually felt vibrations throughout the region-- due to low frequency volcanic tremor accompanying magma ascent, the principal authority of Baños was unreachable by telephone or radio at 10 am when the IGEPN director called to advise/warn him that a large eruption was believed to be imminent and that certain areas could be overrun by pyroclastic flows. Fortunately the local civil defense chief took responsibility and made the decisions to evacuate people from several threatened villages and Baños city before the paroxysmal finale at about 00H30 (local time) on August 17th (Hall et al. 2013). There were no serious casualties in Baños county, although about 60 homes were overrun and scorched by pyroclastic flows, particularly in the Juive Grande sector, where thankfully the residents had responded to the alert and were not injured. The hydroelectric facility of Agoyan (156 MW), 3 km downriver from Baños, also responded successfully to OVT´s early warnings and their engineers carried out the company´s emergency plans to close the intake tunnel to the turbines, thus avoiding damage to the turbines from severe abrasion or blockage by fresh volcanic products; they also opened the dam´s floodgates to permit the flow-through of dense materials. A few days later after a general revision and filling of the reservoir, the facility was again operating normally.
The mayors of the neighboring counties of Penipe and Pelileo with their communities of Bilbao, Puela and Cusúa, situated around the volcano´s flanks, also had their roles to play during the ramping up to the 17th August eruption. On the evening of the 16th the mayor of Pelileo came to OVT to give a verbal order over the radio system that residents of Cusúa and other communities of his county must evacuate. Also, the mayor of Penipe personally drove around the villages of Puela and Palitagua beseeching the citizens to evacuate before the major eruption. Unfortunately, five people didn´t heed the warnings and died in Palitagua due to descending pyroclastic flows. Another short-coming in Penipe county was the lack of coverage of the pan-volcano radio system, impeding a free-flow of critical information to this sector from both OVT and other actors during the crisis. Additionally, given the delays to get people motivated to leave their endangered properties, about 50 head of livestock, some grazing on the upper flanks of the volcano, perished from burns or asphyxiation. Decimeter-size ballistics fell out to 8 km, injuring people and livestock (Arellano et al. 2008). People living to the west and southwest of the cone—such as in the Cotaló area, and who stayed inside their homes, reported huddling beneath wooden tables to avoid impacts while the ballistics crashed through their roofs.
The Vigía network and OVT-- a collaborative effort
Vigía, a Spanish word for somebody who is watching and alert, describes the volunteer efforts of 25 mostly rural-based people who keep the IGEPN informed of happenings in the sector where they live and work around the volcano. As Stone et al. (2014) explained, the vigía network is a prime example of community-based monitoring that contributes to the strengthening of the whole operation. Since scientists at OVT can only observe the volcano’s N and NW flanks, beginning in 2000 farmers living in other sectors of the volcano were asked by OVT staff and Civil Defense leaders to daily report the volcanic activity that they observed from their locations. This system was established with the help of the Tungurahua province Civil Defense director and his collaborators in order to further open lines of communication over all sectors of the volcano that were being affected by the eruption process. Vigías were chosen based upon their observational skills and the proximity of their homes to certain sectors of the volcano or to active lahar-frequented ravines—quebradas. They use hand-held radios that pertain to the local UHF network now operated by the SNGR. Verbal messages given by vigías are received around the clock at OVT and recorded in a logbook and corroborated with the IGEPN´s monitoring data. The area covered by the vigía’s communication network includes the southern part of the volcano in Penipe county, the western flanks of the cone that comprise part of Pelileo county, the Baños area, and the communities of Pondoa and Runtun, above Baños and Ulba (Figure 3) (Stone et al. 2014). Reporting by vigías of the descent of secondary lahars after heavy rains or snow has been very successful and has contributed to the hastening of the closure of roads before vehicles get stuck or buried in lahars. One notable lahar in February 2005 was provoked by a local electrical storm and sent a wall of water and debris into the El Salado hot spring facility located in the Vascún Quebrada, one km upslope of Baños. The vibrations made by the descending lahar caused a notable jump in the data values of the AFM station in that quebrada. This combination strongly suggesting that a lahar of substantial volume (100 m3/s) was in transit. Thanks to the alertness of OVT scientists and their immediate communication of this dangerous situation to Baños Civil Defense authorities and the mayor, plus timely reporting by several vigías, 13 bathers were rescued before the deadly lahar inundated the thermal pools where they were relaxing (Mothes and Vallance 2015; Williams et al. 2008).
Since most vigías have lived with the volcano for many years and are dedicated to agricultural activities and attending to livestock living on the high slopes, they know well their immediate surroundings and are quick to observe anomalous behavior. Their observations offer pertinent and dependable information regarding activity on the upper slopes of the cone; for example, the type of ash fall—lithic or scoria, ash color and grain size, intensity of rainfall and its persistence, the descent of lahars and their texture or the directions taken by ash fall columns and incandescent flows. Many times the information provided by vigías closely matches patterns of seismic and infrasound data. A visual confirmation sent over the radio to OVT, for example, about the descent of a pyroclastic flow or the increase in lahar activity in one of the many quebradas draining the volcano, is a welcome compliment to the instrumental monitoring data. Nightly at 8 pm a radio broadcast (ronda) is hosted in which each vigía reports observations concerning the volcano from his/her sector, and any other pertinent news. OVT personal record the observations of the vigías and then give an oral summation of the day´s seismic and other instrumental recordings of events on the volcano and in the region.
OVT co-hosts an annual meeting/luncheon for vigías, key local officials, and OVT personal with the aim of sharing observational criteria, giving an annual scientific report on the overall trend of the volcano´s activity, and maintaining collegial collaborative ties. Many vigías who live on opposite sides of the volcano might only see each other at these special events, although they all participate in the nightly radio rondas and recognize each other’s voices. The annual meeting thus serves to fortify this volunteer network and keep all involved interested in participating and being attentive when an eruption period is approaching.
At the last two vigía meetings, all vigías verbally shared their observations of recent activity, but they also drew out on paper event time-lines that transpired in their sector during important eruptive periods and what actions they took to benefit their community. This activity fortified their collective memory. OVT personal keep vigías informed about scientific evaluations of the ongoing eruptive process. Special events planned for the future include discussions about strategies for fostering successful care of livestock during continual ashfall. Local university researchers will provide the know-how along with the experience of the vigias in handling their own livestock during multiple ashfall events.
Vigías also assist with the installation of IGEPN monitoring stations, cleaning ash and vegetation off solar panels, and the overall caretaking of monitoring infrastructure. At Tungurahua there have been few robberies of monitoring equipment, perhaps because people perceive that it is to their benefit that the instrumentation keeps working, but they also know that a vigía is attentive to the instrument’s well-being. Through the years the vigías have become more fortified in their community leadership skills. This is because many of them have had to act responsibly during evacuations of their community when dangerous eruptive activity begins. Secondly, they are people with knowledge of how their community has dealt with the eruptive processes and they have perspective on what actions might have to be taken in the future in benefit of their community members.